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TAX 1tJC1 AND ThE DIVIDEND PUZZLE
ABFRC
This paper offers a new explanation of the divideed pizzle, based upon a
nulel in which firme attempt to signal profitability by distrikutin cash to
shareholders. I assisi that dividers and rep.uases are identical, excapt
that dividends are taxed mere heavily. Nevertheless, I demenstrate that,
under certain plausinle corditions, corporations will pay dividends. Indeed,
scnt finns will actually pay dividends, and then retrieve a portion of these
payments by issuirn new equity (perhaçs through a dividend reinvestment
plan), despite the fact that this appears to create gratuitous tax
liabilities. In addition to providin an explanation for the dividend
zzle, I also derive a number of stron results concerning corporate payout
decisions and government tax policy. Sane of these results are surprisin.
For example, the relationship between repurthases and finn quality is hump-
shaped. ?breover, despite the fact that a higher dividend tax rate depresses






Evanston, IL 602081. Introduction
Whydocompanies pay dividends? This question hes proven to be one of
the most vexing puzzles in economics. Many theories have been proposed, but
none has earned generel acceptance. While it is not difficult to account for
the distribution of some earnings, dividends are treated less favorably than
tepurchases (even under current law) and therefore appear to be strictly
dominated as a mechanism for transferring resources to shareholders) The
common practice of paying dividends and issuing new equity simultaneously is
especially difficult to understand, since a company could presumably reduce
dividends and new equity issues by equal amounts, thereby reducing tax
liabilities without altering net distributions.2
In this paper, I offer a new explanation of the dividend puzzle, based
upon a simple model in which firms attempt to signal profitability by
distributing cash to shareholders. Throughout, I assume that dividends and
repurchases are identical, except that dividends are taxed more heavily.
Nevertheless, I demonstrate that, under certain plausible conditions,
corporations will pay dividends, rather than repurchase shares, in order to
signal profitability. Indeed, some firms will actually pay dividends, and
then retrieve a portion of these payments by issuing new equity (perhaps
through a dividend reinvestment plan), despite the fact that this appears to
create gratuitous tax liabilities.
In addition to providing an explanation for the dividend puzzle, I also
derive a number of strong, and somewhat surprising results concerning
corporate payout decisions. Generally, dividend payments rise monotonically
with firm quality. In contrast, the relationship between cash distributed
through repurchases and firm quality is usually hump-shaped, and the function
relating reinvested dividends (new equity) to firm quality may have several2
peaks. Under certain plausible conditions, I also obtain pooling at the
lower end of the quality spectrum. This implies that there may be a large,
heterogeneous population of firms that choose to make no distributions
whatsoever. As quality crosses the upper threshold that defines this pool,
dividends jump discontinuously to some positive level. Thus, there is a
trough in the population distribution of dividends near zero.
The implications for government tax policy are even more surprising. As
one might suspect, a higher dividend tax rate depresses dividends, and raises
repurchases. I also show that it depresses the level of dividend
reinvestment (new equity). Surprisingly, an increase in the tax rate
applicable to repurchases has exactly the same effects; that is, it
stimulates repurchases, and depresses both the level of dividends and
dividend reinvestment. Moreover, in a wide range of circumstances, changes
in these tax rates have absolutely no effect on either total (net)
distributions to shareholders, shareholder welfare, or government revenue.
Although my analysis treats investment as exogenous, it is also clear that
changes in these tax rates have no impact on investment incentives. The
model therefore isolates a set of plausible conditions under which dividend
taxation is economically irrelevant, despite the fact that it affects payout
policy.
While the use of a tax-disadvantaged method of distributing cash may at
first seem counter-intuitive, there is a very simple explanation. If
distributions involve some cost, and if the total cost of distributing a
given amount of cash is higher for lower quality firms, then companies can
potentially use distributions to signal profitability. If distributions are
taxed, then companies will bear a higher cost on each dollar distributed.3
However, high quality firms will not need to distribute as much cash to
shareholders in order to deter imitation by lower quality firms. Reduced
distributions entail both tax and non-tax savings.3 When signaling costs
have a very natural form, the resource savings dominate when tax rates are
low, while the tax coats dominate when tax rates are high. Thus, there is an
optimal tax rate that allows the firm to signal at minimum total cost. Firma
achieve this optimal tax rate by combining repurchases, new equity issues,
and dividends appropriately. Many results concerning tax policy follow
directly from this observation. In particular, when statutory tax rates
change, firms can maintain effective tax rates at optimal levels by adjusting
the payout mix.
To obtain the "optimal tax" result, I formulate a standard signaling
model similar to that introduced by Bhattacharya [1979]. In particular,
paying dividends may expose a firm to various costs if it subsequently runs
low on cash. Higher quality firms are assumed to be more liquid, so they are
less likely to incur these costs. Thus, distributions discriminate between
firma of different quality, and therefore provide a natural basis for
signaling. However, in contrast to previous models, I allow firma the option
of shutting down. This has profound implications.
If a firm can shut down, then the non-tax coats of signaling must be
bounded. Thus, it is impossible for the signaling coat function to be
globally convex, as in standard signaling models. Since lower quality firms
have less to lose, their cost functions must flatten out more quickly than
those of higher quality firms. Thus, though the marginal coat of
distributions is initially higher for lower quality firms, limited liability
implies that this relationship must eventually reverse. The optimal tax rate4
produces a level of distributions thst equates the marginal cost of signaling
for high and low quality firms.4
The paper is organized ss follows. Section 2 describes the model.
Section 3 investigstes the properties of the signsling cost function.
Equilibria with two types of firms are derived in section 4. I consider
models with arbitrary numbers of firms in section 5.Section 6 clarifies the
relationship between this paper and the existing literature. Section 7
concludes with a discussion of implications.
2.The Model
In the section, I present a parsimonious model of corporate policy
regarding distributions to shareholders. Briefly, this model depicts the
following sequence of events. First, the firm undertakes productive
activities, and incurs either actual or potential liabilities. Actual
liabilities refer to debt. Potential liabilities include damages from
lawsuits that might arise in the course of conducting business. Second,
managers acquire private information concerning the firm's prospects. Third,
they attempt to signal this information by distributing cash to shareholders
(implicitly, I assume that operations begin to generate cash flows prior to
this stage). Fourth, all uncertainty concerning returns and potential
liabilities is resolved. Fifth, the managers decide whether or not to
declare bankruptcy. A decision to continue operations with limited liquidity
may entail a financial penalty. Finally, operations terminate and the firm
is liquidated. All liabilities (actual and potential) come due.If the firm
has remained solvent, shareholders receive residual earnings after
compensating creditors.In order to focus exclusively on corporate payout decisions, I do not
model the first stage explicitly. Rather, I simply take liabilities and
investment as given. Thus, I abstract from the possibility that firms might
also signal profitability by manipulating initial capital structure, or by
making commitments to new projects.
Let 6 denote the expected returns from a firm's activities, net of all
liabilities (actual and potential), conditional upon the private information
received by managers in the second stage. Investors are aware that 6
belongs to some set 8, and they also know the ex ante distribution of types
over 8. Throughout much of this paper, I will assume that 8 —(!.61
whereby convention 6 <6and 6<6for all n (2 N). I will also — 1 n-ln
use h(.) to denote the population density over 8.
In the third stage, managers can choose to distribute cash to
shareholders in two different forms (the extension to arbitrary numbers of
forms is immediate). Let yj denote the amount of cash distributed in the th
form. I interpret y1 as repurchases, and y2 as dividends. I will use y to
denote the vector (y1, y2)' .Ywill represent total cash distributions,
i.e. ,Y—
y1+y2.I impose a non-negativity constraint on dividends (y2 >
0), and on total distributions (Y —y1
+
y2
>0).I allow for negative
repurchases in order to represent new equity issues and dividend reinvestment
plans, but rule out the possibility that total distributions are negative.
My object in imposing this last constraint is to abstract from decisions
about capital structure, in order to focus exclusively on payout decisions.5
Distributions of the th type are taxes at the rate r. It is important
to emphasize that, aside from taxes, all forms of payment are completely
equivalent.I will use r to denote the vector (r1, r2). For simplicity, I6
assume that the tax rate on dividends is positive (12 > 0), while repurchases
are untaxed (11 —0).One might justify the latter assumption by arguing
that capital gains taxes are avoidable (ace Stiglitz [1983] ,or
Constantinides and Scholes [1980]). I am inclined to discount this argument
on the basis of empirical evidence (Poterba [1987]). Alternatively, if
repurchases and liquidations are taxed at the aame rate, than it is
appropriate to set —0,and to interpret 2 aa the tax rate on dividends
measured relative to the tax rate for repurchasea. As discussed later, the
analysis is not particularly sensitive to the assumption that 11 -- forthe
moat part, one simply needs to assume that dividends are taxed at a higher
rate than repurchaaea.
When uncertainty is resolved in the fourth stage, managers learn the
true value of earnings and potential liabilities (although these liabilities
do not yet come due). Since 9 represents expected net returns, actual nat
returns equal 9 + c, where £isa random variable with zero mean. Of course,
the firm has already distributed cash to shareholders. Its residual return
(net of all liabilities) is therefore
R—9-Y+c.
When R is sufficiently low, the firm experiences liquidity problems, and
must raise capital at very unfavorable terms in order to complete ita
operations. Specifically (following Battacharya [1979]), I assume that
there is some A > 0 such that if R < A, the firm incurs a cost of fiper
dollar of shortfall. Thus, the total penalty is fl(A -R).
Management elects to shut the firm down in the fifth stage whenever the7
residual value of the firm, net of any costs arising from liquidity problems,
is negative. Accordingly, managers declare bankruptcy whenever
R <fl(A-R).Alternatively, one can express this condition as
R <flA(l+fl)
1 —
Iassume that, if a firm folds, its shareholders sre completely protected
from creditors, and indeed creditors are unable to recover any dividends psid
prior to its collapse.
When the firm is liquidated in the final stage, payments to shareholders
will depend upon expected returns (9), realizations (c), and previous
payments (Y). Let p(Y,9,c) denote these terminal returns. On the basis of
the preceding discussion, we have
9-Y+c if 9-Y+c >A
p(Y,9,c)—(9-Y+r)(l+fl)-flA if A > 9-Y+c > p
O ifp>9-Y+c
Assuming for the sake of convenience that the rate of discount is zero, then
2sa1paymentsto shareholders are given by the sumof terminal payments, and
after-taxdistributions:
p(Y,9,c) +'1-ry.
So far, I have discussed the sequence of decisions and events without
saying much about the objectives of management. It is natural to aaaume thet
management acts to maximize the value of equity. In the fifth stage, I have
therefore assumed that managers declare bankruptcy if and only if the firm is
insolvent. This is not controversial, since all uncertainty is resolved ina
stage four. However, in the third stage, managers have better information
than investors. As a result, one could measure the value of equity in two
distinct ways: either as market value (which is based on investors'
perceptions), or as the managers' assesament of value (which is based on
superior information).
I will assume that managers care about both current market value, and
their own assessment of value. This can he justified as follows. Managers
who act in the interests of current shareholders will certainly wish, ceteris
oaribus, to maximize the current market value of outstanding shares.
Unfortunately, current shareholders are not better informed than other
investors -- ifmanagement dupes the market (perceived value exceeds real
value), it will also dupe the investors it serves. Not knowing that it is in
their interests to sell out prior to realization, some fraction of the
original shareholders will retain their stock and eventually receive a
payment that is below the pre-realization share price. Thus, management
should also care about the actual value of the firm. Similar conclusions
would follow if one assumed that managers would lose their jobs in the event
of bankruptcy, and that this would entail some personal coat (as in Ross
[1977]).
Henceforth, I will use V(y,r) to denote the cuia dividend market
valuation of the firm in stage 3. Ultimately, this function will describe
the endogenous relationship between payout policy and investors' beliefs
generated by a signaling equilibrium. The manager's assessment of value
(cum dividend) will be given by a function V(y,O,r). As discussed in the
preceding paragraph, I will aaaume that management cares about both V(.) and9
V(.).Inparticular, managers will act to maximize the following objective
function:
(1) V(y,r) + a V(y,O,r),
where a is an exogenous parameter.
The function V(.) will represent an objective estimate of the firm's
value under perfect information. That is, it provides an answer to the
following hypothetical question: how would the market value this firm if
investors were as well informed as managers? To simplify this calculation, I
will assume that investors are risk neutral. Thus,
(2) V(y,9,r) —fp(Y,9,r)f(c)dc + Y -ry
—v(Y,9)+ '1 -ry,
where f(s) denotes the probability density of £.Mostof the calculations in
subsequent sections will be based on the assumption that
(3) —N(O,ci2).
3.Proverties of the Signalina Cost Function
It is useful to think of the objective function (1) as
V(y,r) -[-aV(y,6,r)].
When management's objectives are written in this way, it is evident that
signaling creates a benefit through its effect on market perceptions, and a
cost through its impact on actual value. Consequently, we can define the
signaling cost function as10
c(y,9,r) —-aV(y,9,r).
Note thet, ea in the atendard model, cost depends both upon the value of the
signal and the type of firm. The standard assumptions in moat signaling
models are that cj >0,cjj >0,and cj9 <0(where the subscript j denotes a
partial derivative with respect to y.). These assumptions provide the basis
for the "single crossing property" that is typically used to guarantee the
existence of signaling equilibria.
For the model considered here, the signaling cost function cannot
possibly satisfy these standard assumptions. Since the firm can always elect
to shut down, its value is bounded below by 0. Thus, c(y,6,r) ia bounded
above by zero. This rulea out the possibility that coats are globally
convex. Although the coat function might start out convex at y—0, it must
begin to flatten out before reaching the upper bound.
More importantly, it is extremely unlikely that the marginal cost of
signaling would be higher for lower quality firma at g]J. valuea of y.
Certainly, thia condition might hold for small distributions. However, as
distributions rise, the total coat for low quality firma will approach its
upper bound more quickly. This follows from two aeparate conaiderationa.
First, if marginal coat ia initially higher for lower quality firma, total
coat will approach the upper bound faster. Second, lower quality firma have
less to lose, ao the upper bound is lower. Consequently, the coat function
for low quality firma must flatten out sooner. This implies that, for
distributions, marginal coats should be higher for highqualityfirma.





Thus, the impact of taxes on marginal cost is independent to type (8).
Moreover, for any given form of payment, marginal cost depends only on total
distributions. The second derivative of signaling costs is independent of
both taxes and the form of distribution. Like marginal cost, it depends only
on total distributions.
In light of these observations, it is possible to deduce the important
properties of the signaling cost function by analyzing v(.). It is








whereF(.) is the cumulative distribution function associated with f(.). The
signaling cost function is convex at Y if and only if
8 f(Y-9-s-A) 1 +fi
f(Y-8+p)
>
(Recallthat the cost function is inversely proportional to the value
function). Under the assumption that chasa normal distribution (expression
(3)), it is a simple matter to verify that
—exp([2(Y-9)(p-A)
+p2 -12
Since p-A < 0, this ratio falls monotonically with Y, and has a limiting
value of zero. Thus, even when the cost function starts out convex at Y —0,
it eventually becomes concave. Moreover, monotonicity of the likelihood
ratio implies that there is a sinale point of inflection, 1(9) (note that 1
does not depend upon r).
On the basis of the preceding arguments, I conclude that the function
V(.) has the general shape depicted in figure 1 (here, the subscript "-j"
denotes 1 when j —2,and 2 when j —I).The slope of this function
converges to (1 -tj)
as yj get large. The diagram immediately suggests an
important problem: if there are no constraints on corporate distributions,
the optimal strategy is to pay out as much to shareholders as possible,
leaving creditors with worthless claims. In practice, payment of dividends
is constrained by the liquid resources of the firm, as well as by debt
covenants (not surprisingly, creditors anticipate and sttempt to preclude
such practices). A contractual limitation on distributions to shareholders
would eliminate extreme opportunism, without affecting any of the following
analysis (for example, one could choose the level of Y that minimizes V).
Moreover, this constraint would not appear to bind in equilibrium, in the
sense that the contractual limitation would exceed the amount paid to
shareholders under any conceivable realization. The model therefore accounts
for Kalay'a [1982] puzzling observation that actual dividends are usually
strictly less than the maximum amounts specified in debt covenants.
With this specification of signaling coats, what becomes of the single-
crossing property? Figure 2 depicts marginal coat (-eV1(.)) as a function
of yj for two distinct values of 9. From equations (4) and (6), we have
V(y1, yj, ° r) —V(y+92-91,Yj'2' r).13
In other words, the marginal cost function is identical for all types of
firms, except that higher quality shifts this function to the right. Thus,
for each l' 2 8 and y°j' there exists some y with the following
property: below y, the marginal cost of distributing earnings is higher for
low quality firms, as in traditional signaling models, but above y' high
quality firms experience higher marginal coats. Because of this reversal,
indifference curves cross jsa, rather than one. This property is critical
in the subsequent analysis.
In deriving many of the results that follow, I exploit certain
properties of y. In particular, I will focus on pairs of types that include
9, defined as the lowest value of 9 in 8. For 9 and any other 9 8, y' is
determined by the following equation:
*0 *0
V(y, yj, f.) —V(y,yj, 9, c)
After substituting (4), one obtains
o * 0 *
(9) vy(yj + yj' V— vy(yj+ yj' 9)
Note that only the g of y°j and y appears in equation (9). Thus, to
equalize marginal costs between types 9 and 9, we need only worry about
distributions --compositionis irrelevant.6 This greatly simplifies
the determination of y. Let y*(9) denote the value of Y that satisfies
(10) v(Y9) —v(Y9).
* * 0
Then yj —Y(9) -yj
Note also that the vector of tax rates, r, does not appear in equation14
(9). This makes good sense, since r mekes the same contribution to marginal
cost for all types. Thus, y*(•) depends nixupon0.
Finally, I will need one sdditional result concerning the function





* - * * SinceY(9) < Y (0) CY(0),v(Y (0), 0) >0,and v(Y (0), 9) <0<recall




In words, the level of distributions that equates marginal cost between types
and 0 rises with 0, but the increment is less than dollar-for-dollar.
4.Efficient Sieneline and the Dividend Puzzle
A signaling equilibrium assigns a market valuation, V(y,r), to each
vector of signals y, fot a particular tax vector r. Actual value is given by
the function V(y,0,r). In equilibrium, each manager maximizes V(y,r) +
oV(y,0,r)over y, subject to y2 >0and y1 +y2>0.The resulting pattern
of choices justifies market perceptions, in the sense that V(y,r) is the
average value of V(.) for firms that choose y.
My object here is to derive the characteristics of the moat efficient
aignaling equilibrium. For the moat part, I focus on equilibria with
complete separation. Since low quality firma never aignal, efficiency is
determined excluaively by the payoff to high quality firma. It is therefore15
possible to determine the most efficient equilibrium by maximizing the payoff
to high quality firms over all possible separating equilibria.8 Formally,
the problem is to solve






Equation (12) implies that low quality firms are content to choose 0 rather
than y while (13) guarantees that high quality firms prefer y over 0.
Equations (14) and (15) guarantee that expectations are confirmed in
equilibrium. There are also non-negativity constraints on y1 and y1 +y2.
For expositional clarity, I will begin by ignoring the non-negativity
constraints, and then subsequently consider their impact on the solution.
In the appendix (lemma 1), I demonstrate that the solution to the








(18) V°(Y,9,q) —v(Y,6)+ Y -qY.
(That is, V°(.) describes the perfect information value of the firm under the
counterfactual assumption that there is only one form of distribution, which
is taxed at the rate q.)
In deriving the most efficient equilibrium, I have ignored the non-
negativity constraints on y2 and y1 + y2. It is, of course, possible to have
y*(g) C 0, in which case (16) would imply y1 + y2 < 0. Then, for all j and
any initial y1, the marginal cost of increasing yj would be greater for high
quality firms. Consequently, the coat associated with any y > 0 would
also be greater for high quality firms. This implies that it would be
impossible to signal value by making payments to shareholders, regardless of
whether the firm uses dividenda or repurchases.
It is also possible that the right hand side of (17) may be negative.
In that case, the managers of high quality firms would signal by distributing
resources to shareholders exclusively through repurchsses. It is therefore
important to isolate conditions under which this expression is positive. I
will undertake this task shortly.
4.1 An Interpretation
In this section, I offer an interpretation of the optimal signal derived
in the preceding section. Specifically, consider a model in which firms can
distribute cssh to shareholders in only one form. Under this assumption,
there exists an optimal tax rate on distributions, in the sense that this tax17
rate gives rise to a separating equilibrium in which the total Costs of
signaling are smaller than in any other separating equilibrium.9 To
determine the optimal policy with multiple signals, one simply combines
dividends, repurchases, and new equity issues in proportions that yield an
effective tax rate equal to the optimal rate.
The remainder of this section is devoted to an intuitive development of
the optimal tax result. Throughout, I simplify the notation by omitting
subscripts on distributions and taxes, treating y and r as scalars. Since
there is only one form of distribution, this does not introduce any
ambiguity.
In a separating equilibrium, high quality firms select a particular
level of distributions, ,tosignal their type. Together, and the market
perception function V°(.) must satisfy the following constraints:
(19) V°(O,r) + aV°(0.9,r) > V°(,r) + aV(9,r)
(20) V°(0,r) + aV°(O,9,r) < V°(9,r)+
(21) V°(,r) —V°(,9,r)
(22) V°(O,r) —V°(O,,r)
(following the convention introduced earlier, I use the superscript "o' to
distinguish V°(.) and V°(.), the valuation functions with one signal, from
V(.) and V(.), the valuation functions with two signals). These equations
are analogous to (12) through (15). Equations (19) and (20) provide for
mutual non-imitation, while (21) and (22) guarantee that expectations are
confirmed in equilibrium.18
To depict a candidate signaling equilibrium, it is helpful to illustrate
the low quality firm's preferences by drawing indifference curves in (V,y)
space (see figure 3). The formula for an indifference curve is
(23) V +aV°(y,9,r)—
wherek is an arbitrary constant. Note that we can rewrite (23) as
V —k+c(y,9,T).
In other words, to plot an indifference curve, one simply draws the cost
function, and adjusts the intercept.
Since my object is to depict the incentive constraint for low quality
firms (equation (19)), it is appropriate to set k —V°(O,O,r)(l+a)(here, I
have also made use of (22)). For this value of k, one obtains the
indifference curve !depictedin figure 3. Together, equations (22) and (19)
imply that (9,V°(9,r))must lie to the right of I. Equation (22) places an
additional constraint on this point. To represent this constraint, I plot
the function V°(y,9,r) in figure 3.(9,V°(9,r)) must also lie on this line.
As is clear from the figure, there are many solutions to equations (19),
(21) and (22) (anything on V°(y,9,r) to the right of I). All of these points
are legitimate candidates for separating equilibria. However, they are
clearly Pareto ranked. Let 9(6,r) denote the value of 9thatsolves
(24) (l+a)V°(O,Oir) —V°(9,9,r)+ 0V°(9,9,r).
In words, 9(9,r) represents the level of distributions for which the
incentive constraint for lower quality firms juat binds (see figure 3).
Clearly, of all the potential candidates for a signal, 9(6,r) is most19
efficient in the sense that it involves the lowest cost for high quality
firms.
So far, I have ignored the incentive constraint for high quality firms
(equation (20)). In standard signaling models, the single crossing property
renders this constraint redundant -- iflow quality agents do not want to
imitate high quality agents, then high quality agents will strictly prefer to
identify theaselves through signaling. Of course, this observation does not
apply here, since this model violates the single crossing property. To
represent this condition graphically, I draw the indifference curve for the
manager of a high quality firm through the point (9(6,r), V°(9'(9,r),r)).
There are three important cases to consider.
First, the high quality indifference curve may cut the lower quality
indifference curve from above at (9(O,r), °(9(9,r),r)) (see the curve
labeled I in figure 4). This necessarily implies that it intersects the
vertical axis above V°(0,r). Consequently, the incentive compatibility
constraint for high quality workers is satisfied. This is the configuration
found in moat standard signaling models.
Recall that the indifference curves correspond to coat functions, where
the axis has been shifted. The fact that II is flatter than I therefore
implies that, at 9(O,r), the marginal cost of signaling is lower for the high
firm. Thus, this first case arises whenever
(25) 9(9,) < y*(9)
Second, the high quality indifference curve may cut the low quality
indifference curve from below, but nevertheless intersect the vertical axis
above V°(0,r). This occurs when the high and low quality indifference curves20
cross twice, rather than once (see 12 in figure 4). In this case, the
incentive compatibility constraint for high quality firma is still satisfied,
even though the configuration is non-standard. In particular, since 12 is
steeper than I at 9(9,r), the marginal cost of signaling is higher for high
quality firms. Thus, this second case arises whenever
(26) 9(9,r) > y*(9)
and
(27) V°(0,!,r) -V°((O,r),!,r)> V°(0,9,r) -
(thefirst condition implies that the aarainsl cost of signaling is higher
for higher quality firms, while the second guarantees that the cost of
signaling is higher for lower quality firms).
Finally, the high quality indifference curve may cut the low quality
indifference curve from below, and intersect the vertical axis V(0,r)
(see 13 in figure 4). In this case, the incentive compatibility constraint
for high quality firms is satisfied, and there exists no equilibria with
complete separation of types. This occurs whenever (25) holds, but (26) does
not.
I now turn to the central issue, which concerns the relationship between
the equilibria described above and the tax parameter, c. Graphically, as r
rises, I rotates up and V°(y,9,r) rotates down, each pivoting on its vertical
intercept. Thus, the equilibrium signal (9) declines. Figure 5 illustrates
the determination of 9(9,r) for three tax ratea, r1,r2, and r, where
> > 2• Roth the shape and location of indifference curves depend upon
the tax rate. Thus, 'k and Ij represent indifference curves for a high21
quality firm when the tax ratea ia Tk' while !k repreaenta an indifference
curve of the low quality firm. It ia important to bear in mind that Tk'
and are na valid indifference curves when the tax rate is Jk.
Clearly, for sufficiently high tax rates, 9'(O,r) < 't($)(thisconfiguration
ia generated by l' while for sufficiently low (posaibly negative) tax
races, 9(9,r) > y*(9) (this configuration is generated by 2•
How does the tax rate affect management's perception of value? In the
appendix (lemma 2) I demonstrate that a higher tax rate benefits high quality
firms (and leaves low quality firms unaffected) if and only if 9(9,r) >
y*(9)This in turn implies that there exists an optimal tax rate that gives
rise to the most efficient separating equilibrium.I refer the reader again
to figure 5. As one reduces the tax rate from l' (9,r) moves to the
right. Since 9(9,r) <'f(9),this improves the lot of high quality firms.
For some particular tax rate between l and r2 (call it T*), we obtain
**
(28) 9(9,r ) —Y(9).
This implies that the indifference curves of high and low quality firms (1*
* * o **
andI ) are just tangent at the point (9(9,r ), V (9(9,r ),r ).Afurther
*
reduction of the tax rate would push y(9,r) above Y (9), and would therefore
reduce the value of high quality firms. Hence, is the optimal tax rate.
The intuition for lemma 2 is simple. Taxes do not affect the well-
being of low quality firms, and such firms are always indifferent between
0 0,
(O,V(Or)) and (y(9,r), V (y(9,r),r)). Suppose then that some low quality
firm chooses to imitate the high quality firms. In moving from an
equilibrium signal with low taxes to one with high taxes, the resource saving
associated with smaller distributions to shareholders would just compensate22
these firms for the incresse in tax payments. If distributions are
relatively less costly on the margin for high quality firms ((8,r) <
then the sac tradeoff should leave high quality firms strictly worse off.
On the other hand, if distributions are more costly on the margin for high
quality firms (9(8,r) > y(8)), then the ssise tradeoff leaves high quality
firms strictly better off.
*
Clearly, the optimal tax rate r depends upon 8. Since lower quality
firms must be indifferent between (O,V0(O,r*)) and (y*(9) V0(Y*(8),r*)), we
have
(29) *() —(Y*(8)(l4.a)l](V0(Y*(8),8,O) -V°(O,9,O)]
0 *
÷ m[V (Y (8)9,0) -V(O,9,O)]).
So far, I have restricted attention to equilibria with complete
separation. Whenever condition (26) holds, there are also attractive
equilibria with incomplete separation. Figure 6 illustrates this
possibility. Since, the high and low quality indifference curves through any
point (f*), V) are tangent, we can construct an equilibrium as follows.
Let
V0(Y*(8),r) —V°(0,9,r)(l+o)-oV0(Y*(8),9,r)
(that is, V0(Y*(8)r) is given by the vertical coordinate of the tangency
depicted in figure 6). Also, let v be defined as the solution to
nh(9)V0(Y*(8),9,r) + h(8)V0(Y*(8),8,r) c *
(30) h(9) + h(8)
—V(Y (8),r)23
(recall that h(.) is defined as the population density over 8). Suppose for
the moment that h(O) is sufficiently large, so that i lies between 0 and 1.
Low quality firms are indifferent between (0, V°(O,r)) and
(y*(9) V0(Y*(9),r)). I can reaolve this indifference by assuming that the
fraction rj of these firms pay y*(9) to shareholders, while (I-,) make no
distributions at all. As illustrated in figure 6, all high quality firms
*o * '0
strictly prefer (Y (9), V (Y (9)r)) to (O,V (Or)), and therefore choose
y*(9)Thus, incentive compatibility holds for both types of firms, and,
given (30), beliefs about average quality are self-fulfilling.
When condition (26) holds, imperfectly separating equilibria may coexist
with perfectly separating equilibria. We are then confronted with a choice
between equilibria. How do we resolve this smbiguity? The partially
separating equilibrium is more efficient, in the sense that it weakly Pareto
dominates the completely separating equilibrium (high quality firms are
better off).1° On the other hand, standard refinements (such as the Cbo-
Kreps intuitive criterion) do not rule out complete separation. Moreover,
the partially separating equilibrium relies on a very delicate balance of
resolving indifference differently for firms of the same type, and may
therefore seem fragile in comparison to an equilibrium with complete
separation.
Fortunately, consideration of imperfectly separating equilibria does aot
alter the optimal tax result. In the appendix (lemma3),I show that the
payoffs associated with the equilibrium described above are insensitive to
the tax rate. Moreover, when r —r*(9),this equilibrium coincides exactly
with the optimal separating equilibrium. Consequently, the tax rate r*(9)24
gives rise to a separating equilibrium that ia as good as the imperfectly
separating equilibria that may exist for other tsx ratea.
Equation (29) (the "optimal tax" formula) suggests a natural
interpretation of the efficient equilibrium with multiple signals. In
particular, equations (16), (17), and (29) imply that the optimal values of







In other words, one can simply think of each firm as choosing its tax
rate by adopting a particular combination of dividends and repurchases.
Naturally, it selects the optimal rate, r*(e).
4.2 Imolications
I now return to the model with multiple signals, and investigate the
manner in which the optimal signal varies with firm quality (6). In doing
so, I focus on the "standard" case in which the cost function for the lowest
quality firm (-aV(y,9,r)) is initially convex (i.e., 1(9) >0).
First, consider small values of 9.Recall that y*(9) >1(L)forall
9 >8.Therefore, as 9 goes to 8 y*(9) is bounded away from 0.It is then
immediately clear from inspection of equation (29) that
lim r*(9) <0.
925
Consequently, msnsgers use repurchsses to signal gjgjJ.differencesin value.
What happens to y*(9) as 9 gets large? First of all, it is clear from
equation (2) that for any given y, one can make V(y,9,O) arbitrarily large by
selecting a large enough value of 9. Moreover, y*(9) is bounded. In
particular, define V'asthe value of Y that minimizes v(Y,9). It is easy to
show that f*(9) < for all 9 > and that y*(9) has a limiting value of
9 goes to infinity. Consequently, equation (29) implies that
rises without bound as 9 gets large. One can also verify that y*(•) is a
continuous function. Together, these observations imply that for all z > 0,
there exists 9 such that y*(9) —z.
To interpret this result, refer back to equations (31) and (32).
Companies pay dividends whenever y*(9) > 0; thus, there are values of 8 for
which dividends are part of an optimal signal. Also, repurchases are
negative (new equity issues positive) whenever y*(9) >r.
From this it
follows that there are values of 9 for which firms pay dividends and issue
new equity simultaneously.
Although y*(9)maynot rise monotonically with 9, it is negative for
small 9, and gets very large for big 9. Loosely, we would therefore expect
companies to use repurchases when signaling small differences in value, a
combination of dividends and repurchases when signaling intermediate
differences in value, and a combination of dividends and dividend
reinvestment options when signaling large differences.
We have therefore reached a rather surprising conclusion. Despite -- or
rather, because of --taxdisadvantages, firms should use dividends, and even
combinations of dividends and new equity issues to signal sufficiently large
differences in value. Although firms would pay lower taxes if they chose to26
make the ssme distributions as repurchases rather than as dividends, this
would not suffica to signal profitability. Because of taxes, low quality
firms would have an incentive to mimic the repurchase policy, but not the
dividend policy. Thus, a awitch to repurchaaes would necessitate making
larger payments to shareholders in order to preserve the integrity of the
signal. Since larger distributions entail real resource costs, the net
result would leave the high quality firms worse off.
It is also important to understand the economic effects of dividend
taxes within the context of the current model. From equations (31) and (32),
it follows immediately that an increase in the tax rate on dividends reduces
both dividends and new equity issues, but raises repurchases, Total
distributions always equal y*(9), and are therefore unaffected by the
dividend tax. More importantly, a change in the dividend tax rate has
absolutely no effect on government revenue or welfare. If the model had
included an investment decision, then dividend taxation would not affect the
cost of capital. The explanation for this irrelevance result is
straightforward. Firms that use dividends also employ either repurchases or
new equity issues in order to achieve the optimal effective tax rate,
As we change 2' firms respond by changing the composition of distributions
in a way that preserves the same effective tax rate. Changing r2 does not
alter the opportunity set of any manager, and therefore cannot effect real
outcomes.
Throughout this analysis, I have assumed that l —0.In practice, it
is conceivable that repurchases might be taxed more heavily than
liquidations, so that>l>0.In that case, optimal payout policy would






Aslong as r (9) >r,
the firm should pay some dividends. When 1(9)>
theoptimal payout policy includes a dividend reinvestment plan)2
The effects of changing l are counter-intuitive, Specifically, raising
the tax rate for repurchases stimulates repurchases, and depresses both
dividends and dividend reinvestments. The explanation for this peculiar
result is straightforward. An increase in l raises the firm's effective
tax rate at its previously optimal payout policy. The firm must then adjust
*
thepeyout mix to reestablish an effecttve tax rate of r (9). This is
accomplished by shifting to a method of distribution that is more lightly
taxed.
5, Ootimml Sianalina with Many Tymes of Firma
In section 4.2, I demonstrated that firma pay dividends to signel large
differences in value. When these differences are sufficiently large,
dividends are accompanied by issues of new equity. How do these results
generalize to cases in which there are many types of firms? In traditional
signaling models, each type of agent is primarily concerned with deterring
imitation by the next lowest type. If the number of types is large, then
differences between successive types should be small. One might therefore
expect all firma to eschew dividends, and to use repurchases in equilibrium.
As it turns out, this intuition is based on a false premise. Instead, the
results from section 4 generalize in a straightforward way to models with
many types of firms.28
Recall that, in the optimal separating equilibrium, the indifference
curves of the high and low quality firms are tangent. Moreover, the
indifference curve for the high quality firm lies 2YB the indifference
curve for the low quality firm, except of course at the point of tangency.
Thus, if l' efficiently separate themselves from 9's, then 2' will find
it more difficult to deter imitation by the 9's than by the
Consequently, the binding incentive constraint for the 2' will concern the
behavior of 9's.
To illustrate an equilibrium with three types of firms, I exploit the
isomorphism between choosing tax rats, and selecting a particular
combination of dividends and repurchases. Let 8 —°'°l'°2
For n—l,2, I
assign repurchases of y(9,r2) and dividends of y(9,r2), as given by
equations (31) and (32) of subsection 4.1. I graph this allocation in figure
7. 1 represents an indifference curve for type 9n firms when the tax rate
is r*(9) (likewise, 1m is the corresponding indifference curve for type 0
firms). In the proposed equilibrium, the 0's receive point g, the
receive point A with tax rate ç*(91), and the receive point D with tax
rate ç*(92)• We know by construction that neither the l' or the will
wish to imitate the B's. Likewise, the 0's have no incentive to imitate the
or The only remaining question is whether the 9's would imitate
the 2' or vice versa. Note that the are completely indifferent
between point D with tax rate r*(92) and point C with tax rate r*(9l)
(recall lena 3). Because 4istangent to at C, the 2' strictly prefer
C to A when the tax rate is y*(91)• Thus, they prefer their equilibrium
allocation to the one assigned to the l'• A completely symmetric argument29
also implies that the l' will not imitate the Thus, we have an
equilibrium.
Figure 7 suggests that, with arbitrary numbers of types, we can
construct equilibria in the following way: for each n, type 9 firms
distribute the amount y(90,r2) through repurchases, and y(9,r2) through
dividends. In suggesting this solution, I have implicitly assumed that
r*(9) >0and y*(9) >0for all 9 e e. - thisis an important assumption, and
I will return to it shortly. However, if this allocation is feasible, then
it is an equilibrium. As in the three-type example, mutual non-imitation by
each (9,9) pair is assured by construction. In the appendix (lena 4), I
formally prove that this allocation satisfies the mutual non-imitation
constraint for all other pairs of types. Thus, it is an equilibrium.
Moreover, it is efficient in the sense that each type of firm cannot
distinguish itself from inferior types at lower cost in any other signaling
equilibrium.
The preceding result has an extremely important and powerful
implication. In section 4.2, I discussed the relationships between 9 and
dividends, repurchases, snd new equity issues for the case of twotypesunder
the assumption that 1(0) >0.As long as we have y*(9) >0and y*(9) >0for
all 9 >thatdiscussion also characterizes the relationship between firm
type and payout policy in a model with many types of firms. It is worth
emphasizing the feature of equilibrium that allows us to carry over the two-
type results directly to the multi-type model: each type of firm is
primarily concerned with differentiating itself from the lowest type, rather
than from the next lowest type. Thus, better quality firms attempt to signal
larger differences in value, and therefore rely more heavily on dividends.30
The best firms attempt to signal the largest differences in value, and
(4
thereforesimultaneously pay dividends and use new equity.
That happens when r*(9) <0for some 9 -(!)Then there are only
two types, this presents few problems: high quality firms simply signal with
repurchases. However, with more than two types, it greatly complicates the
*
taskof finding equilibria. Suppose, for example, that r °l <0.Then the
will signal by repurchasing shares. The indifference curves of the 9's
and the will then cross at l' equilibrium allocation, and cross again
at some higher value of Y. If -9is sufficiently large, the 2' will
have to concern themselves with imitation by 9's, as before. However, for
smaller values of -l'the 2' will have to worry about imitation by the
next lowest type, as in the standard model.
This observation raises the following question: is it possible to
guarantee r(9) >0for all 98 -(9)I have already argued (section 4.2)
that, if 1(9) >0,then for small values of 9 - wehave y*(9) <0.One
would therefore need to assume that l -0is sufficiently large. With many
types of firms, this is a highly objectionable assumption. In particular, if
we think of models with large but finite numbera of firma as approximations
to the case where 8 is a continuum, then l -ggbe very amall.
The alternative is to assume that 1(0) <0.Thia implies that the
signaling coat function for Ga ia initially concave. In effect, this simply
means that the worst firms are sufficiently bad. In the appendix (lemma 5),
I show that, if 1(9) C0,then for all 9 with y*(9)> ,
[V0(Y*(9),9,O)-V°(O,G,O)]>k31
for some k >0.to understsnd the importance of this result refer back to
the formula for *(9) (equation (29)). Recall that y*(9) rises monotonically
with 9, but is bounded above. Thus, V0(Y*(9),8,0) falls monotonically with
9, but is bounded below. LetV be the lower bound. Then it is possible mm
*
to guarantee r (9) > 0 for all 9 c e -(0)as long as three conditions are
satisfied:
(i) 1(0) C0
(ii) O<a< V(0,9,0) -V — mm
*
(iii) Y (9) >0for all 9 c e -(0).
Under these conditions, one can construct an equilibrium exactly as suggested
at the beginning of this section.
Unfortunately, this does not fully resolve the difficulty. Whenever
1(0) C 0, then, for 9 -Bsufficiently small, y*(9) <0.Consequently,
conditions (i) and (iii) together imply that l -issufficiently jg.x.gg,
which is exactly what we were trying to avoid. However, we can dispense with
(iii) without significantly complicating the structure of equilibria.
I *
It is easy to verify that Y (.)isa continuous function. Supposing
that y*(9) >0for large 9, then under condition (i) there exists 9 such that * * * *
Y (9) —0.Since '1 (.) is monotonic, '1 (9) C0for all 9 C9,and Y (9) >0
for all 9 >9.
Consider some 9 c (9,9). Firms of this type have higher marginal costs
of signaling than do type B's for all y >0.Consequently, these firms
cannot separate themselves from the 9's. In equilibrium, we will have32
pooling at the lower end of the quality spectrum. That is, no firm with 9 C
9 will make any distributions. Let
e —(96 ejo c 9).
The market will correctly perceive that the average value of firms in the low
quality pool is
—( Eh(9)]1 S V°(O,9,O)h(9)
9c8 9c8
When 9's choose y—O, their perceived value is V rather than V(O,9,O) as
13
before.
Higher quality firms must differentiate themselves from all types that
end up in the low quality pool. Since the 9's have lower marginal costs of
signaling than any other type in e, non-imitation by the B's implies non-
imitation by all ece. Thus, the analysis goes through exactly as before,
except that one replaces V(O,9,r) with in equation (15).
As in section 4, one can show that the optimal signal for all 9 > 9
involves
(33) y1 + y2 —y(9)
However, because I have changed a constant in the incentive constraint for
the B's, I must replace equation (32) with
(34) y2 —[r2(l+c)]
1 (V°(y1 + y9O) -V]
+ m[V°(y1 + 2''° -V°(O,9,O)])
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Nowsuppose that type 8 firms distribute y1 (Or) through repurchases
and y*(9,r2) through dividends for each 9 8 -8(recall that if he, the
firm does not signal). To establish that this is an equilibrium, I must
first verify that these choices are feasible. When 8 8 -8,y*(9) > 0.
* *
Analogouslyto lemma 5, one can show that V(Y (8),8,0) -V>kfor all
9 >8,where k* >0(in this case, k* —V(0,9,0)-V).It follows from
**
equation(37) that as long as a is sufficiently small, r(0) > 0 for all
8 c 8 -8.In particular, I replace condition (ii) with
*
(ii)' 0 < a <V(0,8,0)
-V — mm
* ** . ** *
Together,Y (8) >0and r(9) >0imply that y2 (Or2) >0and y1(O,r2) +
y(9,r2)>0,so the prescribed choices are feasible.
By construction, the mutual non-imitation constraints for each pair
(9,8'), 8c8, 0' 8 -8,are satisfied. Through an argument entirely
analogous to that used in the proof of lemma 4, one can also show that these34
constraints are satisfied when 9,9' e 8 -8.Since the equilibrium
prescribes pooling for members of 8, there is no need to consider the case of
9,O'c8. consequently, I have established that the prescribed actions do in
fact constitute an equilibrium. Moreover, in this equilibrium, all high
quality firms (those with 9 e 8 -8)separate theaselves from all inferior
types as efficiently as possible.
5.1 Imolications
I will now consider the relationship between firm quality and payout
policy, under assumptions (i) and (ii)'. Since y**(9) > 0 for all 9 > 9, all





Two important conclusions follow from inspection of this formula. First,
dividends tend to rise with quality. As I pointed out in section 4.2, y*(9)
is bounded, but V°(.) is not, consequently, dividends must increase with 9
when 9 is sufficiently large. Moreover, when a is small, dividends rise
monotonicslly with 9, even when 9 is small. Second, dividends change





Thus, we should not observe any firms that pay trivial levels of dividends.35
Next, consider repurchases and new equity issues. In section 4.2, I
argued that, with two types of firas and 1(9)> 0,lower quality firms would
repurchaae shares, while higher quality firms would issue new equity. With
1(9)C 0,this conclusion must be modified. Note in particular thet
lim ç**(9)—
949
Thus, low quality firms pay dividends and issue new equity. Indeed, as 9
*
approaches9, g distributions (Y (9)) go to 0 --dividendsand new equity
issues become offsetting.
This observation has another interesting implication: repurchases and
new equity issues are both non-monotonic in quality. In particular,
goes to infinity kQth as 9 falls to 9, thas9 becomes arbitrarily large.
Loosely, r**(9) must he U-shaped. Thus, we may well have equilibria where
firms issue new equity at both ends of the quality spectrum in e -8,where
only intermediate quality firms repurchase shares, and where the relationship
between quality end repurchsses is hump-shaped.
One final property of the relationship between firm quality and
distributions deserves mentions. Specifically, net distributions are
bounded. This conclusion follows from two facts: first, net distributions
are equal to y*(9) for 9 c 8 -8,and second, y*(9) is bounded. Thus, the
mapping from quality to payout policy compresses the quality distribution, in
the sense that net distributions never rise above a fixed level, regardless
of how large 9N might be.
In section 4.2, I argued that an increase in either the dividend tax
rate or the tax rate for repurchases would reduce dividends, reduce new36
equity issues, raise repurchases, and have absolutely no affect on net
distributions, government revenue or welfare (nor would it affect investment
if investment was modeled explicitly). All of these results carry over
directly to models with many types of firms. The arguments are exactly as
before.
Ordinarily, it is difficult to solve for signaling equilibria in models
with continua of types. Here, this presents few problems. In particular,
since the relevant incentive constraint always concerns 9, rather than the
next lowest 9, one does not need to solve a differential equation in order to
characterize the equilibrium. Indeed, practically nothing in the preceding
discussion depended on the assumption that 8 is finite, With a continuum of
agents, I can simply let
-[Jh(O)dO]JV°(O,9,O)h(9)dG,
8 8
and proceed exactly as before.
5.2 A Numerical Example
In this section, I exhibit signaling equilibria for particular values of
the underlying parameters. Since many of the relevant variables (e.g.,
y*(9)) are determined implicitly, I was unable to derive a closed-form,
analytic solution. Instead, I have solved for equilibria numerically. In
doing so, I have used a discrete approximation to the normal distribution,
allowing a to take on any of 1,000 distinct values between -So and So.
I consider three different sets of parameter values. For the first or
"base case" set, I take 0 —100,9N —300,and N —100.The lower bound on 9
is effectively a normalization. Experimentation revealed that an upper limit37
of 300 allowed me to exhibit the most interesting properties of equilibrium,
given the values of the other parameters. I used a large value of N in order
to approximate the case of B —[100,300]. the base case also assusies that
a —35,A —150,r —0.3(there is a 30% tax rate imposed on dividends),
p— 0.25(companies pay a 25% premium when raising cash in order to weather a
liquidity crisis), and m —9(managers attach 9 times as much weight to the
actual value of the firm as they do to the firm's current market value). I
also consider a "high tax case," with r —0.5(the dividend tax rste is 50%),
and a "low penalty case" with fi— 0.1(companies pay a 10% premium when
raising cash in order to weather a liquidity crisis).
One aspect of these calculations deserves emphasis. Earlier in this
section, I pointed out that one must use sufficiently small values of m in
** orderto assure r (9) >0for all 9 c B -B.This raises the possibility
that the equilibria discussed in that section exist only when managers are
unrealistically short-sighted. In practice, I ran into problems only for
extremely large values of o. The base case uses m —9,so that managrs
attach much less importance to current market values than to actual values.
**
Evenso, the non-negativity constraints on r (9) are satisfied.
Figure 8 depicts dividends as a function of quality. Note first that I
obtain a heterogenoua pool of non-signalers at the lower end of the quality
spectrum. At that point, dividends jump upward discontinuously, so that one
does not observe any firms paying negligible dividends. For larger values of
9, dividends rise monotonically. Raising the tax rate depresses dividends,
but does not change the identity of firms that pay dividends. Lower
liquidity penalties result in higher levels of dividends (higher quality38
firms must substitute tax costs for non-tax costs in order to discourage
imitation by lower quality firms).
Figure 9 depicts repurchasea as a function of quality. Only
intermediate quality fins repurchase shares. Moreover, the relationship
between repurchases and quality is hum-shaped, as predicted. A higher
dividend tax rate stimulates repurchases, while a lower liquidity penalty
causes managers to reduce repurchases.
As shown in figure 10, the relationship between new equity issues and
quality has an extremely unusual shape (as predicted in section 5.1). For
the lowest values of 9, firms issue no new equity. New issue jump up
discontinuously around 9 —115(as with dividends), but then decline
monotonically when quality gets sufficiently high. A higher dividend tax
rate depresses new equity issues, while a lower liquidity penalty stimulates
them.
Figure 11 illustrates the relationship between distributions to
shareholders and firm quality. There is once again a heterogenous pool of
low quality firms that make no net distributions. However, as 9 rises, net
distributions become positive, rise continuously, and approach an asymptote
(as noted earlier, they are bounded). The dividend tax rate has no impact
on net distributions.
Figure 12 displays market valuation as a function of firm quality. Note
that market valuation is identical for all members of the low quality poo1.
It jumps discontinuously when 9 leaves this poo1, and rises monotonically
with 9 thereafter. The dividend tax rare has no effect on market value.39
6.Relationshic to Previous Literature
There is a close correspondence between lemma 1 snd a result previously
obtained by Milgrom and Roberts (1986]. These authors considered a model in
which agents could either signal conventionally, or throw resources away
observably ("burn money"). They showed that the conventional signal will
only be used up to the point where it differentiates between types. If high
quality agents must incur additional costs in order to deter imitation, then
they will throw away money to make up the difference.
It is possible to cast lemma 1 in these terms. In particular, one can
think of total distributions as the conventional signal, and total tax
liabilities as "burned money." Firms increase the amount of money
distributed to shareholders up to the point where this no longer
discriminates between high and low quality firms; past that point, they throw
money away by paying taxes on these distributions. They control the amount
thrown away by combining dividends and repurchases appropriately.
Despite this observation, one should not be tempted to think of
dividends merely as a method of burning money (analogous to advertising in
the Milgrom-Roberts model). Rather, it is a linear combination of dividends
and new equity issues that is equivalent to burning money. Both forms of
distribution discriminate between high and low quality firms, whereas burning
money does not.
Although applications of signaling theory in the area of corporate
payout policy have become increasingly common (see Bhattacharya (1979, 1980],
Hakansson [1982], Miller and Rock [1984], Kumar (1988], KumarandSpatt
(1987], and John and Nachman (1987]), few authors have ventured explanations40
for the practice of signaling with dividends, rather than repurchases. There
are, however, some notable exceptions.
Ofer and Thakor [1987] formulate a model in which there are explicit
costs associated with repurchases. Unfortunately, it is not clear that these
costs are large enough in practice to overcome the tax disadvantages of
dividends. Moreover, the model does not account for the practice of paying
dividends and issuing new equity simultaneously.
John and Williams [1985], Anbarish, John, and Williams [1987] ,and
Williams [1988] analyze versions of a model which accounts for simultaneous
use of dividends and new equity issues. In this model, firms plan to raise
capital through equity markets, and therefore wish to minimize dilution by
maximizing share price. Since dilution is more damaging to firms with
favorable private information, it is possible to sustain a signaling
equilibrium in which investors interpret any costly activity as a signal of
profitability. There is, however, no particular reason to incur the required
cost by distributing cash to shareholders, rather than by undertaking some
other purely dissipative activity (this contrasts with the current model,
where dividends do distinguish between firms of different quality). More
importantly, this model can only explain the use of dividends in cases where
new equity issues exceed distributions to shareholders. It cannot, for
example, account for a dividend reinvestment plan in which new equity merely
reduces the net amount distributed. Generally speaking, it is not at all
clear that the equity market is an important source of net capital for
corporations.14 It is therefore very unlikely that companies pay taxable
dividends in order to reduce the costs of raising new capital through equity41
markets. Rather --andthis is the heart of the puzzle --equity
transactions are apparently used to reduce net distrihutions to shareholders.
Other non-signaling explanations for the dividend puzzle rely on
assumptions that endow dividends with intrinsic advantages over other forms
of distributions (see e.g. •Brennanand Thakor [1989], or Bagwell and Judd
[1988]). The paper by Bsgwell and Judd is somewhat unique, in that it
isolates some special conditions under which firms would engage in the
apparently pointless practice of exposing corporate resources to taxation by
paying dividends and issuing new equity simultaneously.
7. Imolications and Conclusions
The analysis of sections 4 and S is consistent with the fact that firms
pay dividends, despite obvious tax disadvantages. In addition, it accounts
for the practice of paying dividends and issuing new equity simultaneously
(in the U.S., this is usually accomplished through dividend reinvestment
plans). In contrast to other work (for example, Ofer and Thakor [1987] or
Brennan and Thakor [1989]), these results do not depend on some assumed
dissdvsntsge of repurchases. Here, there are no differences between
dividends and repurchases other than tax treatment. Apparently inefficient
signals turn out to be efficient because of a "double crossing" property,
which is in turn generated by limited liability.
In addition, the model generates m number of ancillary predictions that
are consistent with casual observation, as well as with formal empirical
evidence. First, it predicts that firms should "fine tune" their use of
dividends, repurchases, and new equity issues in order to achieve an optimal
tax rate. In particular, one would expect companies to manipulate the terms
(discounts and limits) of dividend reinvestment plans in order to achieve the42
desired level of reinvestment. In fact, the terms of these plens do vary
widely (see Scholes and Wolfson [1989]). Second, the model predicts that
there will be a potentially large pool of firms that fail to signal, despite
the fact that the managers of some of these firms have better private
information than others. In practice, a non-trivial fraction of firms pay no
dividends and make no repurchaaes)5 It is difficult to believe that the
managers of so many firms have equivalent private information. Third, the
model predicts that dividends should jump discontinuously from zero to some
positive number as quality moves continuously across some threshold. In
other words, even when there are many different types of firms, we should
observe a trough in the distribution of dividends just above zero. Casual
empiricism suggests that the distribution of dividends (as a fraction of
earnings or value) is in fact bimodal, with peaks at 0 and some positive
number, and with few companies making very small payments. Fourth, the
model predicts that share price should rise in response to the announcement
of a dividend increase or of plans to repurchase shares. This is consistent
with exiating evidence (see e.g., Ofer and Siegel [1986] or Dann ]1981]).16
Fifth, the model predicts that higher dividend taxes should depress
dividends. Once again, there is considerable support for this prediction
(see e.g., Poterba and Summers [1985]).
The model also generates a set of predictions that could be tested
empirically, but concerning which there is (to my knowledge) no existing
evidence. First, higher dividend taxes should stimulate repurchaaes, and
depress the use of new equity issues (particularly dividend reinvestment
plans) as a means of reducing net distributions.17 Second, dividend taxes
should have no effect on net distributions to shareholders, or on total43
government revenues. Third, higher tax rates for repurchases (measured
relative to effective tax rates for retained earnings) should stimulate
repurchases, depress dividends and dividend reinveatments, and leave net
distributions and government revenue unaffected. Fourth, the marginal effect
on share price of increasing an announced increment to dividends should be
positive. Fifth, the aareinal effect on share price of increasing an
announced repurchase may be poaitive or negative. It should be positive for
lower quality firma, and negative for higher quality firmaJ8 A similar
observation applies for the use of dividend reinvestment plans.
The model has at least one implication that runs counter to some
existing evidence. In particular, it predicts that dividend taxes are
economically irrelevant (in a more fully elaborated model, they would not
affect investment). Poterba and Summers [1983] have found, to the contrary,
that dividend taxes do appear to affect investment.44
FOOTNOTES
I. Some analysts have pointed out that the IRS might well treat any regular
distributions as taxable dividends. This argument fails to explain the
widespread and consistent reluctance of firms to experiment with
repurchases, and certainly cannot account for the robustness of dividend
policy despite the failure of the IRS to tax repurchases as dividends in
recent years.
2.In the U.S., companies often pay dividends and issue new equity
simultaneously through the use of dividend reinvestment plans.
3.The observation that dividend taxation produces these opposing effects
originally appeared in Gordon and Malkiel [1981]. They also conjectured
that the resource savings might dominate the unit tax costs, but did not
investigate this possibility formally.
4.The argument here is similar to the analysis of Milgrom and Roberts
[1986].
5.Technically, the value of low quality firms might rise monotonically as
one reduced y1 below 0. This suggests that low quality firms could
benefit from injections of new equity. In practice, market
imperfections place limits on firms' abilities to raise additional
capital. In the interests of clarity and tractability, I have simply
taken this limit as exogenous.
6.composition affects costs because tax rates on dierent forms of
distribution may differ. But on the margin, only the j tax rate
matters, and this is common for all types.
7.In deriving this equation, I have used the fact that v9(Y9) —
-v(Y.O)
--seeequation (6).
8.This is also the equilibrium that would be isolated by the intuitive
criterion of Cho and Kreps [1987].
9.The optimal tax result has been derived simultaneously and
independently by Rotemberg [1988].
10. The careful reader may have notice that there is actually a continuum of
imperfectly separating equilibria, corresponding to pairs (9,V(9',r))
lying on I, with tsetappropriately. The tangency depicted in figure 6
actually defines the most efficient of these equilibria.
11. In principle, a simple pooling equilibrium could Pareto dominate the
optimal separating equilibrium. The ranking of these two options
depends critically on the population distribution. It is worth
mentioning, however, that the pooling equilibrium does satisfythe45
Cho-Kreps intuitive criterion, whereas the imperfectly separating
equilibrium and the optimal separating equilibrium do.
12. Of course, the tax system might no longer be symmetric. In particular,
we might have>0when y1 >0,and l —0whenC0.This alters
the analysis in a perfectly straightforward way.
13. There is another class of possible outcomes that I do not consider here.
Suppose that B —°'l'°2•Then, in principle, the 2' might be
willing and able to separate themselves from the l'' even though they
would be imitated by the B's. In other words, there may be an
equilibrium in which the l' don't signal, and where the 9's and
from a pool, and signal by aaking some positive distribution. While
this would change the structure of equilibria for 9c8, it would not
alter any qualitative results pertaining to the behavior of higher
quality firms (those with 9 c 8 8). In particular, those firms would
still have to deter imitation by the 8's, and would do so as efficiently
as possible.
14. In 1989, new equity issues (other than initial public offerings)
amounted to only $22.9 billion, in comparison to roughly $122 billion
worth of dividends. To put this in perspective, note that the tax
payments on dividends may have exceeded new equity issues. Moreover,
stock repurchases and cash layouts have exceeded new equity issues in
every year since 1984. The statistics are taken from Winkler [1990],
Council of Economic Advisers [1990], and Bagwell and Shoven [1989].
15. Between 10% and 20% of the firms on the New York Stock Exchange neither
pay dividends nor repurchase shares in any given year. See Barclay and
Smith [1988].
16. The model also appears to predict that share price should rise when new
equity issues are announced. This is contrary to the evidence (see
e.g., Asquith and Mullins [1986]). However, one must distinguish new
issues that raise capital from new issues that reduce net distributions
(such as dividend reinvestment plans). This model only concerns the
latter.
17. One must, however, be careful in interpreting the relevant data, since
the explosion of repurchsses during the 80's may reflect non-tax factors
(e.g., it may represent attempts to deflect hostile takeovers).
lB. Quality is not observable. Fortunately, the model also predicts that
dividends rise monotonically with quality, so dividends could in
principle be usad as a proxy for quality.46
APPENDIX
Lemma 1: Consider the problem of maximizing (11) subject to (12), (13),
(14), (15).The solution satisfies eouations (16) (17).
£rQa: I will simplify this problem by substituting for V(.) in the
objective function, (12) and (13) using (14) and (15). Some additional
manipulations (using equation (2)) yield the following equivalent problem:
max (l+a)v(y1+ y2,8) +(y11y2) -r2y2
y1,y2
aubject to
(Al) (l+a)v(O,9) > v(y1 + y2,9) + av(y1 ÷ y2,9)
+ (l+a)(y1 + y2 -r2y2)
(A.2) (l+a)v(Y,9) + (y1 + y2) -r2y2 > v(O,9) ÷ av(O,9)
I now argue that, in any solution, (Al) must bind. Suppose not. If I
raise y1 by £andlower y2 by c, then y1 + y2 remains constant, but (y1 + y2)
-
T2 y2
rises. This raises the value of the objective function, and relaxes
the incentive constraint for high quality firms (equation (A.2)). For small
c, (A.l) is still satisfied.
In solving this problem, I can therefore use the fact that (A.l) binds.
I will proceed on the assumption that (A.2) does bind. It is easy to
verify that my solution is conaiatent with this assumption.
Differentiation of the Lagrangian for the preceding optimization problem
yields the following first-order conditions:
(l+m)[v(y1 + '2° + (l-r.)J —A[v(y1+ y2,9) + ov(y1 ÷ y2,O)
+ (l4a)(lTj)]47
for j—l,2, where A is the multiplier associated with (Al). Some tedious
manipulation of these two conditions reveals that
v(y1 + '2' —v(y1+ y2,9).
*
But by the definition of Y (0), this immediately implies (16).
Now I make use of equation (Al). Since this constraint necessarily
binds, I have
(A.3) y2 —[r2(l)]([V°(y1 + y2,9,O) -V°(O,!,O)]
+ a[V°(y1 ÷ y2,9,O) -
Substituting(16) into (A.3), I obtain (17).
Q.E.D.
Lemma 2: Suppose as in section 4.2 that there is only one method of
makina distributions to shareholders. Suppose also that hiah quality firms
sianal by distributing 9'(O,r) (see equation (24)). Then an increase in the
tax rate benefits high quality firms if and only4fj(9,r) > Y(9).
£rQQi:I derive an expression for the derivative of with respect to
the tax rate by differentiating equation (24) to obtain:
(A.4) 9(Or)— (l+a)9(O,r)
v°(9(9,r),O,r) +czV°(9(9,r),9,r)
Since dividends involve a cost within the range that is relevant to this
analysis, V°(.) C 0, so 9(9,r) is negative. The equilibrium level of
utility for the managers of high quality firms is given by
(AS) U(9,r) —(l+a)V°(9(9,r),9,r)




Thus, U(9,r) has the samesignas m[V(9(O,r),9,r) -V°((&,r),9,r)],which
equals the difference between the marginal cost of signaling for high and low
quality firms. When (9r) < y*(9) marginal costs are higher for low
quality firms, so higher taxes make these firms worse off. Conversely, when
(9,r) > Y(6), marginal costs are higher for high quality firms, so higher
taxes make these firms better off.
Q.E.D.
Lemma 3:Suppose as in section 4.2 that there is only one method of
making distributions to shareholders, Suppose that high ouality firms signal
by distributins y*(9) and consider the imperfectly separating epulibrium
where the fraction ,oflow Quality firms also signal (see equation (30)).
Then payoffs are insensitive to the tax rate.
£zQat: Clearly, managers of low quality firms always receive the payoff
(l+a)V°(O,O,r), regardless of whether or not they signal. The managers of
high quality firms receive a level of utility equal to
(A.7) U*(6,r) —;O(y*(9))+ aV°(Y(9),9,r)
o *
I obtain an expression for V (Y (6),r) from the, indifference condition of low
quality firms:
(A.g) VO(Y*(9)T) -(l+a)V°(0,9,r)-V0(Y*(9),9,r)
Substitution of (AS) into (A.7) yields
* * *
U (Or) —(l+n)v(0,9)+ o[v(Y (9)9) -v(Y(9)9)].49
Note that this expression does not depend upon r.
Q.E.D.
For the next result, I need some definitions. Let
* * *
(A.9) y (9,r) —(y1(9,t2,y2(9,r2))
(recall that r —l'2'and that I have assumed—0).Also let
(A.lO) W(9,r) _V(y*(9,r),9,r)
Finally, for y,t c and w,h c B, let
(All) U(y,w,h,t) —w+ aV(y,h,t).
Lemma 4: For all. 9,O'c 8 -(9)£111190 9',
U(y*(9,r),W(9l,r),9,r) >U(y*(9,r),W(9,r),9,r)
Remark: This lemma implies that type 9' does not have an incentive to
imitate type9for any 9 c 8 -(9).
Proof:Define
* *
r(9,9') —U(y(9,r),W(9,r),9' ,r) -y(9' ,r),W(9' ,r),9' ,r).
This represents the gain to type 9' from imitating type 9. From equations
(A.9), (A.l0), (All), (2), (31), and (32), we have
* *
(A.l2) ('(9,9')— m[v(Y(9)9') -v(Y(9)9')]
* *
+ [v(Y (9),9) -v(Y(9'),9'))
* * * *




whichimplies (using (A.9), (A.l0), (All), (2) (31) and (32)),
* * * ** *
(A.13) [v(Y (9),8)-v(Y (9'),8')] +(l+a)[Y(8)(l-r (9))-Y (8')(l-r (8'))]
-a[v(Y*(9),9)
-v(Y*(8),9)].
Substitution of (A.13) into (A.12) yields
(A.14)r(8,8')-[v(Y*(9),9)
-v(Y*(8),9)]
* * - [v(Y(8)9) -v(Y(9'),9)].
* *
Suppose8 >8'. Then Y (8) >Y(8'). Note that, by (A.14),




Recallthat for allY> Y (9'), v(Y9) > v(Y.9'). Combining this with
(A.l5), we have
1r(8,8') < 0.
A completely symmetric argument holds for 8 <8'.
Q.E.D.
Lemma 5:Suppose 1(9) < 0.Then for all 8 withy*(9)> 0,
V0(Y*(8),8,0) -V°(0,9,0)>k
for some k >0.
* * IfY(9) < 0, then for 8 close to 0, Y (8) < 0. Since Y (8) is
continuous (this is easy to check), if there exists 8 with y*(9) >0,then
*
therealso exists 8 with Y (9) —0.Note that51
(A.l6) VY*(6),6,0) -V°(O,9,0)—k>0
Since Y(.) >0 (see section 3), y*(9) <0 for all 9 < 6. Therefore, we need










But V(Y*(9),9,0) < 1 and 0 < Y(6) <1(see section 3), from which it
follows that
(A.18) V0(Y*(6),9,0) > 0.
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